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One of the fundamental phenomena of Modernity is the erosion 
of meaning1. In recent years, the discussion around the “come 
back of religion”2 and the “post-secular society”3 seems to 
affirm the problem of a deficit of meaning in (post-)modern 
society and to invalidate the conviction — firmly held by many —
that secularization is inevitable and irreversible 4 and that it is 
accompanied by an increase in possibilities the individual can 
freely choose from to construct an existence that is experienced 
as meaningful and fulfilled5. If it would probably be an over-
interpretation of the extent of the phenomenon if one was to 
talk unambiguously about a change of paradigm with regards to 
secularization, it seems at least possible, at present, to revisit the 
role transcendence can play for human beings as a constituens 
of meaning at the beginning of the 21th century and to argue in 
favor of approaches that allow for perspectives that go beyond 
mere immanence but without falling short of the state of the art 
of the knowledge attained in philosophy and the natural sciences 
over the last 250 years6. In the present paper, I will take up this 
problem of a crisis of meaning and argue that there is an intrinsic 
link between the possibility to relate existence to a perspective of 
transcendence and the possibility to “recharge” our being in the 
world with meaning.
The starting point of my reflections shall be a philosophy 
that might at first sight seem little appropriate for the endeavor 
of defending perspectives of transcendence in complete respect 
of the body of knowledge at the beginning of the early 21st 
century but which will, as I hope, reveal itself—  at least in some, 
and in my opinion essential, aspects —  as a very useful and 
instructive approach. The approach in question is the highly 
polemical defense of faith formulated by Søren Kierkegaard, 
who posits unambiguously that an existence without anchorage 
in transcendence is inevitably to be considered as an existence 
in despair and boredom. Kierkegaard’s argument will uncover 
the problematic structure of the modern attempt of self-creation 
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01   See Max Horkheimer (1947), 
22: “Meaning is supplanted by 
function or effect in the world of 
things and events.” See also the 
interview Horkheimer gave the 
SPIEGEL in 1973 which is even more 
pessimistic (or fatalistic?) on this 
behalf than Eclipse of Reason.
02   See the volume edited by 
Norbert Bolz & Esther Gisberger 
(2008) on this issue.
03   See on this topic Peter Nynas 
et al. (2013); Péter Losonczi/Aakash 
Singh (2010); Ziebertz/Riegel (2008).
04   See Peter L. Berger (2013), 
who first represented the theory 
of secularization and who has 
recently edited a volume with the 
eloquent title Nach dem Niedergang 
der Säkularisierungstheorie 
(“After the decline of the theory 
ofsecularization”).
05   See for instance Bolz/
Girsberger (2008); Graf (2004);  
Höhn (2007).
06   This is the fundamental claim 
for instance of Alvin Plantinga who 
aims “to show how it can be that 
Christians can be justified, rationally 
[…] not just ‘ignorant fundamentalists’ 
but sophisticated, aware, educated, 
turn-of-the millennium people 
who have read their Freud and 
Nietzsche, their Hume and Mackie” 
(A. Plantinga, 2000, 167). With 
regards to the new interest for issues 
of transcendence see also Vattimo/
Derrida (2001); Vattimo (2002); 
Marion (2007); Swinburne (2004); 
Caputo/Scanlon (2007); Reder 
(2013). Even Habermas, who earlier 
in his life had a rather distanced 
relationship with religion, is today  
suspected to have undergone a 
“theolological turn” (see Austin 
Harrington, 2007, 45–61).
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through free choice among a number of equivalent possibilities. 
In a second step, I will illustrate that a crucial aspect of the 
argumentative structure of the highly intransigent, demanding, 
and provocative — and certainly in some aspects at least 
philosophically contestable7  —  Kierkegaardian apology of faith 
can indeed be identified also in a contemporary “state of the art” 
approach to transcendence which, even though it explicitly takes 
its distances from Kierkegaard’s conception, remains intimately 
linked to the latter when it comes to the importance of faith 
for relating in a meaningful manner to the things of the world 
(understood broadly and thus including human relationships as 
well). This second approach is developed by the contemporary 
German philosopher Thomas Rentsch.
Beyond immanent possibilities: Kierkegaard’s claim  
for transcendence
To understand the Kierkegaadian claim of the insurmountability 
of a transcendent perspective for a meaningful existence, I will 
take as a starting point his definition of Man, which is crucial for 
his argument. In Sickness unto Death8, Kierkegaard defines very 
concisely: “Man is Spirit” (SuD). Shortly thereafter, he specifies 
that one of the fundamental characteristics of the human being is 
its synthetic structure: “Man is a synthesis of the infinite and the 
finite, of the temporal and the eternal […]” (ibid.). Kierkegaard 
stresses that it is the human spirit — which he equates with the 
Self — that posits this synthesis of the infinite and the finite, of 
the temporal and the eternal. Insofar as the human being is essen-
tially characterized through its being spirit, Man is — in an essen-
tial sense — Man only if and insofar as he transcends immanence 
and relates himself to the infinite, to eternity. If he remains with-
in pure immanence, he falls short of being a human and of being 
an authentic Self. As Man is thus incapable of fully realizing him-
self within immanence, this falling short of having adopted an 
authentic Self manifests itself in boredom and despair. The only 
option that remains to avoid conscious despair is, according to 
Kierkegaard, the drowning out of boredom and despair through 
divertissement in the Pascalian sense or, alternatively, through 
poeticizing a reality experienced as unsatisfying9.
07   See Hüsch 2016.
08   Sickness unto Death 1941 
[1849]; in the following quoted as 
“SuD” in the main text.
09   See in particular Søren 
Kierkegaard’s Seducer’s Diary as 
an attempt to fully poeticize reality 
(Kierkegaard 1987, 301-445). See 
also Konrad Paul Liessmann (1991). 
In fact, Kierkegaard unfolds a very 
detailed analysis of all possible 
ways of missing one’s authentic 
Self, possibilities that are derived 
from the synthetic structure through 
which he identifies this Self. The 
different kinds of despair that result 
from the wrong positing of the 
synthesis that constitutes the Self 
are developed in SuD, 28ff.
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In the context of the present paper, the most important 
analysis Kierkegaard proposes concerns his interpretation 
of what he calls the aesthetic existence. This analysis is first 
developed in Either/Or, his earliest writing, which provides the 
preliminary Kierkegaardian reflections on this topic which he 
subsequently unfolds in more detail in Sickness unto Death10. 
It is in Either/Or that he abundantly and eloquently illustrates 
the seductive power and yet existential vacuity of aesthetic 
existence. His methodological proceeding is very particular 
as he develops his strongly ambivalent interpretation through 
a double —  and perspectivist — approach. In a sort of literary 
fiction11, he first lets an “aestheticist” express his world view and 
life style, which, in a reply to this aesthetic way of existing, is 
criticized and put into perspective by an “ethicist”.
Through this double perspective, Kierkegaard makes very 
clear that the aesthetic existence appears to be appealing at first; 
however, such an existence cannot but inescapably fail and in 
the end leads inevitably into despair12. In this sense, the ethicist 
explains in the second part of the work that, “nothing finite, 
not the entire world can satisfy the soul of a man who feels the 
longing for eternity within him” (Kierkegaard 1987, 758).
Given that the aesthetic existence anticipates a certain number 
of fundamental features of the way of life in contemporary 
western society (or, to put it the other way round, as the modern 
western way of living could appear to be a trivialized form of 
the Kierkegaardian aesthetic existence13), it is worth insisting on 
the fact that Kierkegaard has the aesthetic existence inevitably 
shipwreck in boredom and despair. His explanation for this 
inevitable failure of aesthetic existence is related to the problem 
of a reduction of modern orientation to merely immanent 
perspectives. In focusing exclusively on immanent possibilities, 
the human spirit experiences the limitedness inherent to them. 
The immanent possibilities from which we can choose lack 
distinction and appear to be — in the literal sense —  equivalent 
and thus exchangeable and random. According to Kierkegaard, 
as long as we remain within the realm of immanent possibilities, 
we lack a valid criterion of discrimination which would allow us 
to prefer one possibility rather than another14. In the framework 
of Kierkegaardian thought this is inevitable insofar as human 
10   It is important to stress 
that both, Either/Or and Sickness 
unto Death are works published 
under pseudonyms within the 
framework of what Kierkegaard calls 
“indirect communication”. Indirect 
communication as a methodological 
tool brings with it important 
implications for the interpretability 
and thus the possible meaning(s) 
of these writings. However, for 
reasons of clarity, I will not respect 
Kierkegaard’s “wish” and “prayer” 
(Kierkegaard [2009], 529) to 
quote the respective pseudonym 
rather than his own name (see 
ibid.), even though this means 
neglecting one layer of reflection. 
As the restricted space available 
for this paper requires certain 
concessions and the impact of 
indirect communication on my point 
in this article is limited, I will speak 
of “Kierkegaard” instead of naming 
the respective pseudonym. For the 
importance and the implications 
of the Kierkegaardian method of 
“indirect communication” see Hüsch 
(2006), Schwab (2012).
11   See Hüsch (2004), 38ff.
12   One of the forms of despair 
he introduces is the despair of not 
knowing that one is desperate, which 
he sees as a major particularity of 
the “bourgeois” existence that he 
characterizes, in The Concept of 
Dread, as “spiritlessness” (1957 
[1844], 84; in the following as “CD” 
in the maintext).
13   The insightful study Die 
Erlebnisgesellschaft by the German 
sociologist Gerhard Schulze 
illustrates that modern society is 
more and more oriented towards 
what is interesting, stimulating, etc. 
and what helps us to make a kind of 
“special event” (“Erlebnisprojekt”) 
out of our lives (Schulze [1992], 13).
14   It is interesting that this, 
again, corresponds precisely to 
the diagnostic of Schulze in Die 
Erlebnisgesellschaft, who comes 
to the conclusion that the multitude 
of possibilities we can choose from 
leads to boredom rather than to 
satisfaction (see ibid., 116).
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spirit, by essence, needs to be linked to transcendence and the 
question is, at this point, to what extent the link to transcendence 
helps overcome the problem of boredom and despair.
This interconnection of transcendence and meaning is very 
comprehensively developed and illustrated in Kierkegaard’s 
analysis of one of his core concepts, the instant (or the moment 
according to other translations for the Danish Øjeblikket) in 
The Concept of Dread, where he posits that all possibility of a 
real presence is annihilated without its relatedness to eternity: 
“The instance,” explains Kierkegaard, “is this ambivalent 
moment in which time and eternity touch one another, thereby 
positing the temporal, where time is constantly intersecting 
eternity and eternity constantly permeating time. Only now 
does the division we talked about acquire significance: the 
present, the past, and the future.” (CD 79).
The crucial element in Kierkegaard’s reflection concerning 
the problem of transcendence is in fact a double postulate: (1) that 
human existence, when limited to immanence, is an existence 
without presence; and (2) that it is thus a requirement for Man 
to complement and to complete the immanent perspective of 
the world by a transcendent perspective. Only through the 
relatedness to transcendence does immanence obtain a reality 
in an authentic sense. This is illustrated in Either/Or where 
the ethicist describes how, through the choice to relate oneself 
to the eternal, the possibilities of the immanent world become 
literally charged with meaning. Kierkegaard illustrates this 
by using the metaphor of “metamorphosis” (Kierkegaard 
1987, 271): “Everything,” the ethicist explains, “comes back 
again, but transfigured” (ibid.). Only through the relationship 
that is established with transcendence, life gains “beauty, 
truth, meaning, continuance” (ibid.). The meaninglessness 
and despair, the nothingness and groundlessness of aesthetic 
existence are transfigured into meaningfulness and hope 
through the absolute choice of the Self now grounded in eternity. 
In other words, the equivalent and meaningless immanent 
possibilities can only become meaningful and our possibilities 
in an authentic sense, if they gain reality through their being 
permeated by the eternal. In the instant in the Kierkegaardian 
understanding, transcendence is intruding on immanence and 
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thus charges the latter with meaning; on the other hand, the 
“intersecting” of eternity by the temporal guarantees that the 
synthesis incarnated by Man does not fail to take the temporal 
into account, as —  Kierkegaard insists on this point — this is 
precisely Man’s mission: to succeed in integrating both, the 
temporal and the eternal, in this synthesis (which, evidently, 
would otherwise not be a synthesis). Man thus remains inevitably 
and deliberately attached to immanence, but the embeddedness 
of the immanent — represented through immanent possibilities — 
in transcendence makes these very same possibilities come back 
transformed into authentic possibilities.
It should have become clear that Kierkegaard’s proposal to 
escape from the erosion of meaning brought forth by Modernity 
through the sole focus on our immanent possibilities requires 
us to concede our dependence upon something that transcends 
us and the world. However, it is important to emphasize that 
Kierkegaard’s approach is not to be understood as ‘reactionary’ 
or the expression of ‘backwardness’. On the contrary, he makes 
a clear effort not to fall back into the traditional attempts to 
provide metaphysical ultimate justifications. Rather he contents 
himself with delivering the proof that a transcendent perspective 
is existentially necessary and at the same time possible. In 
other words, Kierkegaard does not overstretch the reach of 
human reason by succumbing to the attempt to give proof of 
the existence of God, but he claims that we existentially need 
the possibility of a perspective of transcendence all the while 
insisting on the fact that reason cannot deny this possibility. 
Reason, in fact, is not able to prove, nor to refute, the existence 
of God, transcendence is placed beyond the possibility of 
rational accessibility. In a certain way, to abandon the attempt 
to provide ultimate justifications is a major argumentative 
advantage, but his claim is at the same time an inconvenience: 
By placing transcendence beyond what is positively knowable, 
Kierkegaard’s claim can certainly not be refuted scientifically; 
on the other hand, from a philosophical perspective, this claim 
of existential necessity remains a mere claim. However, his 
approach helps to carry the possibility of transcendence through 
the breakdown of traditional metaphysics with the advent 
of Modernity, as it is not concerned by the delimitations of 
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knowledge brought about by science. If and to what extent this 
approach may be updated for present times will be discussed 
later in this paper. At present, I would like to go over to Thomas 
Rentsch’s approach to transcendence which, in some relevant 
aspects, will reveal similarities with Kierkegaard, even though it 
takes explicitly its distance from the latter, as previously stated.
The rationality of transcendence: Th. Rentsch’s 
phenomenological hermeneutics of transcendence
Rentsch develops his reflections on transcendence in the context 
of the question of the possibility of meaningfully talking about 
God. Rentsch aims to show that phenomena of transcendence 
can or even have to be considered as accessible by reason, and he 
thus explicitly refuses to place faith beyond reason as was done 
by Kierkegaard. If the focus of his argumentation seems at first 
to be quite different form Kierkegaard’s, I will try to show that 
in fact his intention is to ultimately promote a perspective on the 
world that is embedded in transcendence; and I will argue that it 
is precisely in this more implicit but finally central intention that 
we find common ground between the two approaches, where the 
existential relevance of both concepts unfolds.
In a study published in 2005, concisely and unambiguously in 
its focus called God, Rentsch first emphasizes that his primary 
aim is what he calls a “Standortbestimmung” of philosophy 
as a discipline, that is, to determine the “self-understanding 
of philosophy today” (Rentsch 2005, VIII15). One of his basic 
assumptions is that the question of God is still topical in 
the early 21st century. According to Rentsch, even under the 
conditions of post-Modernity, the question of God remains 
“inextricably linked to the question of an authentic meaning 
of our existence” (ibid., IX). However, what is particularly 
important for Rentsch is to show that if we want to establish 
a meaningful discourse on God we cannot fall back into 
traditional ways of dealing with the question. Philosophizing 
on God and transcendence must respect the philosophical 
state of the art: “A critical philosophizing cannot fall short 
of Kant’s critique of ontology and metaphysics, Heidegger’s 
critique of ontology, Wittgenstein’s critique of language, as 
15   All quotations in the main text 
are my translation from the German 
edition. The longer quotations 
are also provided in their original 
German version in the footnotes.
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well as Adorno’s critique of society, ideology, and culture” 
(ibid.)16. It is thus for Rentsch crucial to reflect on the conditions 
of the possibility of a meaningful discourse on God from the 
highest level of philosophical knowledge. Departing from 
the philosophy of language of the later Wittgenstein, Rentsch 
specifies that a statement about God is not to be confused with 
a statement on an object in the world. However, as he argues 
with Wittgenstein, if the discourse on God is not referring to an 
“object” in this empirical sense, this does not mean that taking 
about God becomes necessarily and inevitably meaningless or 
irrational. Rentsch illustrates this as follows:
The status of the discourse on God cannot be understood as 
if, beyond our familiar and everyday world I, there would be 
some world II that could be related to the former empirically, 
temporally, and spatially, a sort of parallel universe. With 
our language, our acts, our thinking and our understanding, 
we cannot leave our human and finite world. Through the 
question of God and the question of the status of statements 
on God, we are confronted with the most fundamental 
questions of the critique of knowledge in the sense of Kant, 
which ask about our own constitutively finite essence. […] 
In articulating statements on God, we indicate that these 
statements have this eminent status, that they are precisely 
not to be understood as empirical statements on facts. 
(ibid. 12)17
To legitimate the talking about God as a discourse on something 
that is not to be confused with the naming of facts within 
the empirical world, Rentsch claims that there is nothing 
extraordinary in talking about something which is not in this 
sense to be considered as ‘facts’. In fact, as he states, we do that 
every day insofar as not only God, but reality as such cannot be 
reduced to a simple statement of facts on objects. Reality is not 
an agglomerate of ‘objects’ but reality, as our reality, is already 
a non-empirical phenomenon. With a certain proximity to 
Heidegger’s concept of being-in-the-world, he notes:
16   “Ein kritisches Philosophieren 
[…] kann heute nicht mehr hinter 
die Ontologie- und Metaphysikkritik 
Kants, die Ontologiekritik 
Heideggers, die Sprachkritik 
Wittgensteins, sowie die 
Gesellschafts- und Ideologie- bzw. 
Kulturkritik Adornoszurückfallen.”
17   “Der Status der Rede von 
Gott kann nicht so bestimmt 
werden, dass einer uns bekannten, 
alltäglichen Welt I eine jenseitige 
Welt II räumlich-zeitlich-empirisch 
angestückt wird, eine Art 
Paralleluniversum. Wir können mit 
unserer Sprache, mit unserem 
Handel, mit unserem Denken und 
Erkennen die menschliche, endliche 
Welt nicht verlassen. Die Frage 
nach Gott und nach dem Status von 
Gott-Sätzen konfrontiert uns mit 
Grundfragen der Erkenntniskritik 
im Sinne Kants, die nach unserem 
eigenen, konstitutiv endlichen 
Wesen fragen. […] Indem die Sätze 
von Gott reden, indizieren sie, dass 
sie diesen eminenten Status haben, 
dass sie gerade nicht als empirische 
Tatsachenbehauptungen verstanden 
werden können.”
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Reality is the entire reality of the world in its irreducibility. 
It is within the horizon of its being and of its meaning that 
we discover and develop our understanding of ourselves and 
our possibilities of action to lead a good and successful life 
in awareness and liberty. (p. 49) 18
Building upon this backdrop, Rentsch specifies:
If we consider as reality not just crude objectity 
(Gegenständlichkeit): stones, atoms, things, scientifically 
reduced quantities, but rather the real within the concrete 
reality of life in which Men evolve in a highly rational way, as 
free beings open to and creating meaningfulness, then there 
is nothing in which God could be closer than in authentic 
existential and interexistential practice: If we transcend 
ourselves in the direction of authentic claims of meaning 
and validity in our common quest for truth, in the direction 
of truthfulness, justice, and solidarity also with weak human 
beings in need of help. The concrete reality of living revealed 
this way can, with good reasons, be called true and authentic 
reality, and thus God as ens realissimum. (ibid., 91)19
Rentsch thus introduces a postulate of transcendence 
which, in the initial analysis, relies simply and essentially 
on our being-in-the-world as such. Consequently, his 
argumentation starts with the evocation of three undeniable 
phenomena of transcendence which do not immediately make 
a claim for a ‘beyond’ in the vertical sense of the word, but 
remain ‘horizontally’ transcendent. These three phenomena 
of transcendence are only accessible for us insofar as we 
dispose of reason. Or, to put it differently: Rentsch claims that 
transcendence does not require us to go beyond reason, but, on 
the contrary, that its manifestations cannot be grasped except 
through reason. The three phenomena he is talking about are (1) 
the transcendence of being; (2) the transcendence of the Self; and 
(3) the transcendence of language.
According to Rentsch, these three phenomena of 
transcendence are nothing less than the “principal conditions of 
the possibility and reality of our human world” (ibid., 67)20. He 
18   “Wirklichkeit ist die ganze, 
irreduzible Weltwirklichkeit, in 
deren Seins- und Sinnhorizont wir 
unsere Selbstverständnisse und 
Handlungsmöglichkeiten entdecken 
und entwerfen, um in Freiheit ein 
gutes und gelingendes Leben 
bewusst zu führen.”
19   “Begreifen wir als wirklich 
nicht krude Gegenständlichkeit: 
Steine, Atome, Dinge, szientifisch 
reduzierte Quantitäten, sondern 
begreifen wir das Wirkliche als 
die konkrete Lebenswirklichkeit, 
in der Menschen im höchsten 
Maße vernünftige, freie und Sinn 
erfahrende und entwerfende 
Wesen sind und sein können, dann 
ist uns Gott nirgends näher als in 
authentischer existentieller und 
interexistentieller Praxis: wenn 
wir uns selbst transzendieren in 
Richtung auf authentische Sinn- 
und Geltungsansprüche in der 
gemeinsamen Wahrheitssuche, 
in Richtung auf Wahrhaftigkeit, 
Gerechtigkeit und Solidarität auch 
mit schwachen und hilfsbedürftigen 
Menschen. Die uns in diesen 
Richtungen erschlossene konkrete 
Lebenswirklichkeit lässt sich mit 
guten Gründen als die wahre, 
eigentliche Wirklichkeit bezeichnen, 
und somit Gott als ens realissimum.”
20   “unvorgängige[n]
Bedingung[en] der Möglichkeit und 
Wirklichkeit unserer humanen Welt.”
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thus emphasizes the fact that, on the one hand, these phenomena 
are not empirical facts, but that, on the other hand, they are 
something fundamentally different from mere opinions, ways 
of perception, or perspectives. They are concrete without 
being material, and they are of the utmost importance for us as 
human beings insofar as “without the absolute transcendence” 
represented by these phenomena, “immanence is not even 
possible, real, or simply conceivable” (ibid., 78)21.
One of the main aspects in his claim that these phenomena 
of transcendence not only are not irrational but even depend 
on reason is to stress the limitedness of the concept of reason 
forwarded by scientific-functionalist ways of thinking. His 
critique of the reductionist scientific conceptualization of reason 
allows Rentsch to refute the argument according to which the 
discourse on phenomena of transcendence is per se irrational. 
It is important to emphasize, says Rentsch, that transcendence, 
as a phenomenon, is “knowable, rational, and universal”, 
criticizing all variations of “reductionist objectivistic-scientistic 
world views which cut off reason and transcendence” (ibid., 108).
It is clear, then, that Rentsch distances himself from 
Kierkegaard, who stressed the necessity to go beyond reason, 
that one finds God only via the absurd22, and it might be useful 
to take a closer look at this difference. First, we can state that 
each thinker takes a distinct and diverging point of departure: 
If Kierkegaard is very clearly immediately interested in the 
existential question of how to live a meaningful life, Rentsch 
starts form a more theoretical standpoint, grounding his position 
in reflections on philosophy of language by starting with the 
argument that the discourse on God does not necessarily have to 
be irrational(ist). He backs up this claim by showing both that 
and how transcendence can be made accessible to reason. He 
even goes further, showing that we need reason to become aware 
of transcendence. In Rentsch’s argumentation, the name “God” 
is not assimilated to a Kierkegaardian credo quia absurdum, but 
on the contrary plays the role of a stand-in for what he calls, 
with Heidegger, an “ek-static reason”, even if it is accessible 
only ex negativo as that which, precisely, is transcendent with 
regards to us human beings23. However, in linking meaning 
and transcendence intrinsically, he remains, in this respect, 
21   “[o]hne diese absolute 
Transzendenz ist keine Immanenz 
möglich, wirklich oder nur denkbar.”
22   However, it would be 
erroneous to think that Kierkegaard 
is irrationalistic and hostile to 
reason per se. In fact, it is only within 
the – decidedly for him essential – 
framework of faith that Kierkegaard 
considers that we have to go beyond 
reason. On the other hand, there 
is evidence that Kierkegaard was 
highly interested in and fascinated 
by the natural sciences, as illustrates 
the following note in his diary: “I 
have been enthusiastic about the 
natural sciences and still am, but I 
do not think that I will make them my 
principal study. The life by virtue of 
reason [Fornuft] and freedom has 
always interested me most, and it 
has always been my desire to clarify 
and solve the riddle of life. The forty 
years in the wilderness before I 
reach the promised land of natural 
science seem too costly to me, all 
the more since I believe that nature 
can also be observed from a side 
that does not involve insight into the 
secrets of science” (Kierkegaard, 
1999, 22). There seems, in this 
respect, to be some similarity with 
Blaise Pascal, who was fascinated 
by scientific reason as well but 
convinced that the questions that 
matter in an existential way cannot 
be answered by it.
23   See Rentsch (2005) 208: 
“Reason attains, through critical 
reflection on itself, the boundaries 
which are constitutive of the 
meaning it generates. The practical 
insight into these boundaries leads 
to the ek-static reason which does 
not simply split off and negate its 
link to transcendence but includes 
it critically, hermeneutically, and 
dialectically and tries to understand 
it. The word ‘God’ is the epitome 
of this insight, combined with 
the discourse of the miracle, the 
inexplicable, and the mystery as 
a disclosure of meaning” (“Die 
Vernunft gelangt durch kritische 
Selbstreflexion an ihre für sie 
sinnkonstitutiven Grenzen.  
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very close to Kierkegaard, a proximity that becomes even more 
striking in another – and crucial – context, as he attributes 
the highest existential significance to the relationship that we 
entertain with transcendence. Thus he states:
This is why authentic processes of conversion are this 
profound and earthquake-like: When we enter into a 
relationship with ourselves that is based upon God, 
absolute meaning, and the miracle of creation, the whole 
understanding that we had until then of the world and of 
ourselves is transformed. In a certain sense, nothing remains 
as it was before.” (ibid., 113)24
There is a striking parallel in this description of religious 
awakening and the passage from Kierkegaard’s Either/
Or we examined earlier, where the ethicist talks about the 
“metamorphosis” the things in the world undergo as a result 
of this opening up to transcendence; and it is certainly not by 
accident that there is another element in Rentsch’s analysis which 
seems to respond to the Kierkegaardian concept of the instant 
as the category par excellence of our relatedness to the eternal. 
Rentsch proposes a conceptualization that is quite similar to 
Kierkegaard’s. In this sense, Rentsch notes:
We get partially beyond an understanding based upon 
finitude and transience and become open to potentials of 
meaning of transcendence and adopt thus the perspective 
of a meaning that cannot be eradicated by the transience of 
time: Eternity, not understood as infinite temporality and 
iteration, but as an irruption of transcendence into immanence 
[…]. (ibid., 113/114)25
There are thus interesting parallels between the description 
of transcendence as an experience, as an irruption into 
immanent life, as it is proposed by Rentsch on the one hand, and 
Kierkegaard’s illustration of the instant on the other. However, 
the major gap remains that Rentsch insists on the rational 
accessibility of the phenomena of transcendence he identifies 
and that he thus refutes the necessity to concede the “leap of 
faith” Kierkegaard argues for.
(23, cont.) Die praktische Einsicht 
in diese Grenzen führt zur 
ekstatischen Vernunft, die ihren 
Transzendenzbezug nicht bloß 
abspaltet und negiert, sondern 
kritisch-hermeneutisch und 
dialektisch einbegreift und praktisch 
zu verstehen sucht. Der Inbegriff 
dieserEinsicht ist das Wort Gott, 
verbunden mit der Rede vom 
Wunder, vom Unerklärlichen und 
vom Geheimnis als der Eröffnung 
von Sinn.”).
24   Aus diesem Grund sind auch 
authentische Bekehrungsprozesse 
so tiefgreifend und grundstürzend: 
Wenn wir in ein auf Gott, 
absoluten Sinn und das Wunder 
der Schöpfung gegründetes 
Selbstverständnis eintreten, dann 
wandelt sich das gesamte Welt- 
und Selbstverständnis. In gewisser 
Weise ist nichts mehr wie vorher.”
25   “öffnen uns den Sinnpoten-
tialen der Transzendenz und haben 
so die Perspektive zeitüberlegenen, 
durch zeitliche Vergänglichkeit nicht 
tilgbaren Sinns wahrgenommen: Ew-
igkeit nicht als unendliche zeitliche 
Endlichkeit und Iteration, sondern 
als Hereinbruch der Transzendenz 
in die Immanenz […]” (Rentsch 
2005, 113, Hervorhebungen Th. R.). 
See Also: “Es gehört konstitutiv mit 
zu diesem seltenen Sinnereignis, 
dass seine wahre Bedeutung unter 
Umständen nur in wenigen Augen-
blicken intensiv erfahren wird. In 
ihrem dauernden, den Alltag implizit 
tragenden Wirken ist die Gegenwart 
des Ewigen wiederum meist nur 
unbewusst gewiss.” This is, trans-
lated into academic language, what 
Kierkegaard had described in the 
Concept of Dread (see p.10 of the 
present paper).
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The question is, then, how the above reflections can be 
linked more explicitly to the question brought up in the 
introduction: To what extent do Rentsch and Kierkegaard, 
with their respective approaches, respond to what can be called 
the ‘need for transcendence’ of the modern world? It is clear 
that both are most profoundly convinced that no immanent 
aims, circumstances, or objectives can fulfill Man’s need for 
meaning, meaning understood in its most eminent sense26. 
Both, Kierkegaard and Rentsch claim that the configuration of 
the modern world is to some respect hostile to the generation 
of meaning in this sense, but the fundamental question that 
comes out of this claim is whether the link to transcendence 
as it is proposed by Kierkegaard and Rentsch, respectively, 
is convincing before the backdrop of the configuration of 
Modernity.
Here, both approaches have to be discussed separately in that 
their answers diverge in terms of their methodology, though 
they finally converge, in a certain sense, in their essence. It 
might seem that Kierkegaard’s “leap of faith” is more difficult 
to defend as a claim in the early 21st century. This is certainly 
true in the sense that Kierkegaard, in his writings, sticks to a 
personal relationship to a personal God27. However, if one 
focuses more precisely on the structure of his argumentation, 
the judgment could be more nuanced. At no point does 
Kierkegaard go against scientific knowledge. Nor does his leap 
of faith necessitate the denial of scientific knowledge. Unlike 
some contemporary reactionary interpretations of Christianity, 
Kierkegaard places his conception of faith entirely beyond the 
reach of human reason and does not succumb to the problematic 
and today widespread temptation to defend as knowable what is 
not—which allows him to avoid bringing science and faith into 
a relationship of rivalry and claiming the superiority of faith 
within the realm of scientific reason and reasoning. 
This battle cannot be convincingly fought by faith in the 21st 
century and Kierkegaard already saw that it could not reasonably 
be fought in the 19th century. Rather, Kierkegaard’s major claim 
is that reason cannot provide the meaning that Man needs from 
an existential point of view. Faith and reason do not enter into 
conflict for Kierkegaard as both have their specific relevance, 
26   On the various forms of 
meaning see E. Angehrn (2010).
27   On the possibility of 
preserving the idea of a personal 
God that can be addressed 
through praying, see E. Tugendhat 
(2003). If one does not necessarily 
have to agree with the distinction 
between religion and mysticism 
he introduces, I would be inclined 
to agree with him insofar as the 
image of a transcendent “father” 
who is taking part in our lives (see 
ibid., 111ff.), seems indeed to be 
problematic today.
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but this relevance is situated at different levels. If this means, on 
the one hand, as was said above, that he does not deny scientific 
knowledge, it means, on the other hand, that faith can never 
be proven, but it can never be refuted scientifically, either. His 
claim is thus not to deny reason as such, but to throw overboard 
reason in the act of believing. Reason preserves its domain of 
competence and of relevance, but there is a realm beyond reason, 
which remains open for faith. In this sense, Kierkegaard’s 
passionate Christendom remains as valid as it remains valuable. 
However, the main difficulty with Kierkegaard’s position is that 
his claim of the necessity of faith and transcendence is not based 
upon a logic necessity, but on what I have called an existential 
necessity. This preserves it from entering into conflict with 
science and scientific rationality, but it weakens his point from 
a purely philosophical standpoint28; which leads to the position 
of Thomas Rentsch who, unlike Kierkegaard, tries to show, as 
we have seen, that the discourse on God can be philosophically 
justified and meaningful, and, in extension of this claim, that 
faith does not necessarily have to be irrational or irrationalistic. 
Thus, he approaches the problem by demonstrating that the 
currently prevailing understanding of reason is to be considered 
as highly reductive and can  —  and even needs to be —  extended 
to phenomena that go beyond the mere understanding of 
reason as a capacity of grasping what is materially present29. 
This is a first result to retain: The advancement of knowledge 
that characterizes the past centuries does not authorize us 
to simply evacuate issues of transcendence as irrational. On 
the contrary, there is an important need for non-reductive 
philosophical approaches that help us overcome the limitedness 
of the dominant, one-sidedly naturalistic and  —  to use a more 
polemical adjective  —  simplistic world views. As Rentsch 
shows, there are undeniable phenomena of transcendence that 
no scientistic reason will ever be able to grasp because this 
kind of reductive reason does not look beyond the limits of 
immanence, even if transcendence undeniably breaks into 
and — transcends it.
28   Kierkegaard was perfectly 
conscious of this fact and it is not 
by accident that he never calls 
himself a philosopher but considers 
himself a religious author. See Søren 
Kierkegaard (1962 [1859]), 12.
29   In this point, Rentsch is 
as close to Wittgenstein as to 
Heidegger who both, in their 
respective manners, denounce the 
reductive character of the scientific 
and positivistic world view. Rentsch 
is actually one of the earliest 
researchers who in a detailed study 
stressed fundamental parallels in 
the thought of Wittgenstein and 
Heidegger (see his PhD thesis, 
Rentsch [1985]).
30   “Tendenz der westlichen 
wissenschaftlich-technischen Zivil-
isation zu naturalistischen, biologis-
tischen, neurophilosophischen oder 
funktionalistischen Selbstdeutungen 
des Menschen.”
31   It is little surprising that 
he makes reference to the old 
tradition of negative theology which 
represents for him a model of 
orientation that still deserves our 
attention. See on negativity also 
Rentsch (2000).
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Conclusion
To conclude, it seems possible to say that faith remains a 
possible — and important— cornerstone of the attempt of us 
humans to orient ourselves in the world, despite the current 
“trend of western scientific-technical civilization to have 
recourse to naturalistic, biologistic, neurophilosophical, or 
functionalistic self-interpretations” (Rentsch 2005, 19)30. Faith 
does not enter necessarily into conflict with enlightened reason 
as it is incarnated by the advances of knowledge in the natural 
sciences. The question of faith and the question of God are not 
in contradiction with science, but it would be better to say that 
science cannot even ask these questions in a meaningful way 
because it would otherwise transgress its own boundaries and 
domains of competence. For Rentsch, transcendence represents 
a phenomenon that appears at the limits of reason and remains 
thus negatively accessible31. 
However, if Rentsch seems to make the claim that the famous 
“leap” is unnecessary, one might object that in his approach 
there is no immediate nor necessary transition from the proof 
that there are phenomena of transcendence and that these are 
accessible for human reason to what is commonly called “faith” 
in the same sense as it is certainly possible but not necessary 
either to use the name of “God” for the phenomena identified by 
Rentsch. So I would argue that what causes this transition from 
the knowledge about phenomena of absolute transcendence to 
faith, inevitably remains inaccessible for human reason32. This 
would imply then that, in one sense, Kierkegaard was right to 
claim the there still is the necessity for a “leap”, for something 
inexplicable and beyond reason and reasoning that allows us to 
take the step from the reasonably accessible to what faith means 
in its most eminent sense.
32   Søren Kierkegaard very elo-
quently alludes to the (modern) gap 
separating philosophical reflection 
from philosophy as a praxis of living 
that enters into play here in his ironic 
comments on Schopenhauer (see 
Schwab 2011, 329-382), as, unlike 
for Schopenhauer, for Kierkegaard 
philosophizing is meaningless if it 
does not have any impact on the 
philosopher’s own life. Schopenhau-
er actually refers himself explicitly 
to this problem when he writes: “For 
here also is seen the great distinc-
tion between intuitive and abstract 
knowledge, a distinction of such 
importance and of general applica-
tion in the whole of our discussion, 
and one which hitherto has received 
too little notice. Between the two is a 
wide gulf; and, in regard to knowl-
edge of the inner nature of the world, 
this gulf can be crossed only by 
philosophy. Intuitively, or in concreto, 
every man is really conscious of all 
philosophical truths; but to bring 
them into his abstract knowledge, 
into reflection, is the business of 
the philosopher, who neither ought 
to nor can do more than this. […] A 
saint may be full of the most absurd 
superstition, or, on the other hand, 
may be a philosopher; it is all the 
same. His conduct alone is evidence 
that he is a saint […]. It is therefore 
just as little necessary for the saint 
to be a philosopher as for the philos-
opher to be a saint; just as it is not 
necessary for a perfectly beautiful 
person to be a great sculptor, or 
for a great sculptor to be himself 
a beautiful person. […] To repeat 
abstractly, universally, and distinctly 
in concepts the whole inner nature 
of the world, and thus to deposit 
it as a reflected image in perma-
nent concepts always ready for the 
faculty of reason, this and nothing 
else is philosophy” (Schopenhauer 
1969 [1844], 383–384). It is clear 
that Kierkegaard would in no case 
subscribe to this point of view.
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